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Labor Law Illiteracy: Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis and Janus v. AFSCME
Michael J. Yelnosky*

Labor law’s profile has long been receding. Private sector
union density, at 6.5 percent, is almost thirty percent below its high
in 1954.1 And the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which
governs labor relations in the private sector, became law in 1935
and has been substantially amended only twice—the last time in
1959.2 Cindy Estlund, a leading scholar of labor and employment
law, has identified this statutory stasis as partly responsible for
what she calls the “ossification” of American labor law.3 In The
Death of Labor Law?, Estlund explored the related decline in the
attention paid to the subject by legal scholars.4 “For much of the
twentieth century,” she wrote, “labor law scholars were at the
* Dean and Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks
to RWU Law 2L Sarah Boucher for her assistance.
1. Drew Silver, American Unions Membership Declines as Public
Support Fluctuates, Pew Res. Ctr. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails
-far-behind-public-support/ [https://perma.cc/8DGJ-298V]; see also U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Union Members
Summary (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/Z9RT-VR32] [hereinafter Economic News
Release].
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
3. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1531 (2002) (“I know of no other major American legal
regime—no other body of federal law that governs a whole domain of social
life—that has been so insulated from significant change for so long.”).
4. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Death of Labor Law?, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 105 (2006).
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forefront of the legal academy. The field drew leading figures in
academic law ......... Nowadays, by contrast, labor law is regarded as
a virtual backwater in the legal academy.”5 Most contemporary
labor law scholarship, she observed, is focused on explanations for
the decline of private sector unionization.6
Estlund’s focus is federal labor law, which governs the rights
and responsibilities of employees, unions, and employers in the
private sector.7 Public sector labor law, by contrast, never even had
its day in the sun. While there are examples of prominent legal
scholars turning their attention to public sector labor law, the
subject is mostly ignored in American law schools and, if not
ignored, viewed as arcane and insignificant. A brief internet search
did not turn up a single course in public sector labor law being
offered in the fall of 2018 at any law school in New England.
One practical explanation for the fate of public sector labor law
is that it is state law, unlike private sector labor law, which consists
almost exclusively of one federal statute—the NLRA.
The
patchwork quilt of applicable state laws can be confounding. It is
simply more difficult for interested observers to become experts.
On the other hand, public sector unions are thriving as compared
to their private sector counterparts. Union density in the public
sector, at 34.4 percent, is more than five times higher than it is in
the private sector.8 And changes to public sector labor law have
found their way into the national consciousness from time to time.9
Nevertheless, the proposition that public and private sector labor
law and labor unions do not occupy a significant place in the
minds of academic or practicing lawyers is not controversial. Nor
should the suggestion that labor law illiteracy—a knowledge gap
among lawyers and judges about the content, purpose, operation,
and significance of labor law—is increasing. In this Survey, I
describe how the majority’s reasoning in two United States
5. Id. at 106.
6. Id. at 113.
7. Id. at 113–14.
8. Economic News Release, supra note 1.
9. See Noam Scheiber, Can Weak Unions Get Teachers More Money?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/sunday-review/
unions-teachers-money-strike.html [https://perma.cc/GLM2-KMUC]. Recent
examples include the 2011 amendments to the public sector labor laws in
Wisconsin championed by Governor Scott Walker as well as a series of teacher
walkouts in Oklahoma, Arizona, and West Virginia in early 2018.
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Supreme Court decisions from the 2017 term reflect notable labor
law illiteracy. Specifically, it appears that a majority of the Justices
do not understand basic principles of labor law under the NLRA.10
Moreover, the majority seems to know that collective bargaining in
the public sector can increase the cost of government operations and
has concluded that is a justification for interpreting that law to
curtail the power of public sector unions. The majority finds the
tendency of collective bargaining in the public sector to increase the
cost of government operations prima facie unacceptable, even
though a primary purpose of labor law, perhaps even its raison
d’etre, is to improve the bargaining power of individual employees,
which is likely to result in better terms and conditions of
employment for organized workers, including increased wages and
benefits.11 Reading these decisions makes one wonder whether
some of the Justices are aware that in the NLRA, Congress—to
whom the conservative majority regularly pledges fealty as the
preeminent policy-making body under our constitutional
structure—
[D]eclared [it] to be the policy of the United States to . . .
encourage the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and . . . protect[] the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment
or other mutual aid or protection.12
The first of the cases is Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, where the
Court faced a question about the scope of the NLRA.13 As a general
matter, the NLRA prohibits employer interference with employee
rights created by section 7 of the Act, including the right to “engage
in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”14 The specific question before
10. See infra pp. 110–13.
11. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–32 (2018); see also
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
12. 29 U.S.C § 151.
13. See 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 157. This statute provides: “employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
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the Court in Epic Systems was whether provisions in employment
contracts prohibiting employees from joining as plaintiffs in
arbitration to enforce their rights to appropriate compensation
under state and federal law were unenforceable under the NLRA.15
Epic Systems was a group of consolidated cases, and the Court
described one in some detail.16 The plaintiff, a junior accountant at
Ernst & Young, believed that his position had been misclassified as
exempt from the overtime pay requirements of federal and state
law. He sued Ernst & Young in federal court for overtime pay on
behalf of a class of Ernst & Young junior accountants.17 Ernst &
Young moved for an order compelling individual arbitration of the
plaintiff’s claim.18 Ernst & Young relied on an agreement the
plaintiff signed as a condition of employment, which provided he
would arbitrate any employment disputes he had with Ernst &
Young and that he would assert claims only on his own behalf with
claims “‘pertaining to different [e]mployees [to] be heard in separate
proceedings.’”19
The district court granted the motion, relying on the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion for support.20 The FAA, enacted
by Congress in 1925, provides:
[A] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.21
And in Concepcion, the Court concluded that the FAA preempted
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . . . .” Id. Further, section 158(a)(1) protects those
rights by making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title.” Id. § 158(a)(1).
15. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1620.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Morris v. Ernst &
Young, No. C-12-04964, 2013 WL 3460052, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2005).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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California law making a class action waiver in the arbitration
provision of a consumer contract unenforceable.22 The Court
explained that because class arbitration was inconsistent with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration, a state law requiring class
arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA.23
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s arbitration order
in Epic Systems because it concluded the NLRA’s protection of
concerted activity trumped the FAA’s directive to enforce
arbitration agreements.24 The Ninth Circuit majority explained
that the class action waiver in the arbitration agreement prohibited
employees from engaging in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection, a right expressly protected by the NLRA.25
The Supreme Court reversed, 5–4, holding that nothing in the
NLRA rendered the class arbitration waiver unenforceable.26
Justice Gorsuch, writing for his conservative brethren, went so far
as to assert that “as a matter of law the answer is clear.”27 Even
granting that the winners get to write history, this is an astonishing
assertion.
Almost as astonishing was the articulated basis of the Court’s
conclusion—that the NLRA could not possibly have anything to do
with the FAA and arbitration agreements because it “secures to
employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it
says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or
arbitral forum.”28 Assuming the majority opinion was not
intentionally misleading, the majority’s reasoning is clear evidence
of labor law illiteracy.
On one hand, the majority in Epic Systems was correct when it
explained that, under Concepcion, state law prohibiting
enforcement of an arbitration agreement “just because it requires
bilateral arbitration” must give way to the FAA’s general command
to enforce arbitration agreements.29 However, that misses the
point entirely. Concepcion involved an arbitration agreement
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
Id.
See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
Id.
Id. at 1631.
Id. at 1618.
Id. at 1619.
See id. at 1623.
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between consumers and their wireless network provider.30 Epic
Systems, by contrast, involved an agreement between employees
and their employer.31
Because of the NLRA that makes all the difference. The NLRA
gives employees the right, as the majority acknowledged, to form
unions and engage in collective bargaining, but also “to engage in
other concerted activities for . . . other mutual aid or protection.”32
It is hornbook labor law that the NLRA’s “protection of ‘other
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection’ extends
beyond . . . efforts to form a union and engage in collective
bargaining.”33
Indeed, a unanimous Supreme Court held in 1962 in NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., that an employer committed an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA when it disciplined seven non-union
employees for engaging in a spontaneous walkout to protest what
they considered to be an unacceptably cold workplace.34 The
employees did not walk out to form a union or to engage in collective
bargaining.35 The Court nevertheless found the walkout protected
because the employees were acting in concert to protest their
conditions of employment.36 Employees, the Court explained, do
not “lose their right to engage in concerted activities under § 7 [of
the NLRA] merely because they do not present a specific demand
upon their employer to remedy a condition they find
objectionable.”37 The Court continued:
The fact that the company was already making every effort
to repair the furnace and bring heat into the shop that
morning does not change the nature of the controversy that
caused the walkout. At the very most, that fact might tend
to indicate that the conduct of the men in leaving was
unnecessary and unwise, and it has long been settled that
the reasonableness of workers’ decisions to engage in
30. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
31. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1616.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
33. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 397 (2d ed. 2004).
34. 370 U.S. 9, 18 (1962).
35. See id. at 15–16.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id.
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concerted activity is irrelevant ....... 38
Remarkably, the Epic Systems majority concluded that this
seminal Supreme Court case on the breadth of section 7 warranted
a simple citation, where it was characterized as a case involving
efforts of a group of employees “related to organizing and collective
bargaining.”39
That characterization patently misunderstands Washington
Aluminum and the support it gives to the proposition that
employees wishing to join together as plaintiffs in a Fair Labor
Standards Act proceeding are engaging in concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection.40 The protection of that right by the
NLRA, which was enacted thirteen years after the FAA, justifies an
exception to the general command of the FAA. Moreover, as Justice
Ginsburg noted for the dissenters, the NLRA is specific about the
rights it creates for employees, while the FAA says nothing about
collective proceedings in arbitration.41 Her dissent is simple and
direct—conditioning employment on an agreement to refrain from
engaging in section 7 activity is an unfair labor practice, and that
makes enforcement of such an agreement unlawful as a matter of
federal law.42
In short, my critique of Epic Systems is that the majority never
really joins the issue because of what appears to be its fundamental
misunderstanding of a basic tenet of American labor law—that
collective employee action in support of improved wages and
working conditions is protected even if that action is not related to
unionization or collective bargaining.
The trouble with the majority opinion in Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31,
is different but related: the opinion displays a hostility to the
concept of unionization and collective bargaining in the public
38. Id. at 16.
39. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018) (citing
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 13).
40. Moreover, as early as 1942 the National Labor Relations Board found
that three employees who joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit asserting violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act were engaged in concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection. In re Spandsco Oil & Royalty, 42 N.L.R.B. 942 (1942). And
many federal courts continued to do so. See, e.g., Brady v. Nat’l Football
League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (1991).
41. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1641–42.

2019]

LABOR LAW ILLITERACY

111

sector, which is a policy choice the Court obviously understands
that states are permitted to make for themselves.43 The Janus
majority declared unconstitutional collective bargaining provisions
that required public employees who were represented by but
opposed to joining a union to pay for the costs of union
representation.44 Requiring the payment of these so-called “agency
fees,” the majority held, was a compelled subsidy of speech that
violated the First Amendment rights of employee objectors.45
The union argued, among other things, that the Court should
characterize the speech being subsidized—arguments made by
union representatives in negotiations over wage increases, for
example—as speech about matters of private concern, speech that
is generally entitled to less First Amendment protection in public
sector employment.46 The Janus majority rejected that argument
and concluded that all speech connected to collective bargaining in
the public sector involves matters of public concern.47
In so doing, Justice Alito revealed a hostility toward collective
bargaining in the public sector when he went beyond explaining
why First Amendment rights were genuinely at stake in public
sector agency fee arrangements.48 He could have made this First
Amendment point by simply explaining that collective bargaining
in the public sector involves speech that has an impact on the cost
and operation of government, core matters of public concern.
Instead, he piled on by describing, in some detail, massive budget
deficits and unfunded pension liabilities plaguing states, counties,
and municipalities—deficits that he attributed to public sector
collective bargaining.49
He went on to describe bargaining between AFSCME and the
State of Illinois in a way that suggested the union was irresponsible
43. See 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
44. Id. at 2460.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2474.
47. Id. at 2460.
48. See id. at 2474–76.
49. Id. (explaining that: (1) Illinois’s credit rating has been downgraded to
near junk status because of unfunded pension and retiree healthcare
liabilities; (2) the nationwide cost of state and local employees’ wages and
benefits is nearly $1.5 trillion—more than half of those jurisdictions’ total
expenditures; and (3) many States and cities struggle with unfunded pension
and retiree healthcare liabilities and other budget issues).
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in responding to the State’s demands to reduce its employmentrelated expenses:
But when the State offered cost-saving proposals on these
issues, the Union countered with very different
suggestions. Among other things, it advocated wage and
tax increases, cutting spending “to Wall Street financial
institutions,” and reforms to Illinois’ pension and tax
systems (such as closing “corporate tax loopholes,”
“[e]xpanding the base of the state sales tax,” and “allowing
an income tax that is adjusted in accordance with ability
to pay”).50
Skepticism about the social value of collective bargaining in the
public sector can be seen in another aspect of the majority’s opinion.
The majority cited favorably to an amicus brief submitted by two
former general counsels to the Governor of Illinois, both of whom
regularly advised the Governor on how the State should proceed in
public sector labor negotiations.51 The majority cited the brief for
details about the finances of the State of Illinois, but the narrative
of the brief is clear—collective bargaining in the public sector is bad
public policy.52 The following excerpt from the brief is a good
example:
The causes of Illinois’s financial woes are longstanding and
bipartisan. Yet much of the State’s current financial
condition results from the conflation of public sector union
bargaining and legislative lobbying ............ Unlike private
sector unions, which pit labor against management in
meaningful negotiations, public sector unions permit labor
and management to sit on the same side of the table. There
they purport to bargain with the taxpayers’ money.53
While there is little dispute that private and public sector
collective bargaining are different, with the outcome of the former
determined more by market forces and the latter by political forces,
50. Id. at 2475.
51. Id. at 2475 nn.12–13.
52. Id. at 2475.
53. Brief for Jason R. Barclay & James S. Montana, Jr., Former General
Counsel to Governors of the State of Illinois, as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 4, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466), 2017 WL 6311777.
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there is genuine and good faith disagreement about whether
facilitating collective bargaining in the public sector is bad public
policy. For example, Professor Clyde Summers, one of the leading
labor law scholars of his generation, wrote that with regard to
monetary issues like wages, public sector collective bargaining
helps level the playing field for public employees who will often be
dramatically outnumbered by citizens opposed to tax increases.54
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy seemed positively
dismissive of the argument made by the Solicitor General of the
State of Illinois, David L. Franklin, who explained that agency fee
agreements furthered the State’s interest in having well-funded
and stable public sector unions to serve as partners in management
of the State’s workforce and the effective provision of public
services.
MR. FRANKLIN: [W]e have an interest at the end of the
day in being able to work with a stable, responsible,
independent counterparty that’s well-resourced enough
that it can be a partner with us in the process of not only
contract negotiation.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: It can be a partner with you in
advocating for a greater size workforce, against
privatization, against merit promotion, against—for
teacher tenure, for higher wages, for massive government,
for increasing bonded indebtedness, for increasing taxes?
That’s—that’s the interest the state has?55
Of course, justices often play “devil’s advocate” during oral
argument, but I am willing to bet that is not what Justice Kennedy
was doing when he conveyed to the State’s lawyer that he views
public sector collective bargaining largely, if not completely, as a
54. Clyde Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: A Different Animal, 5 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441, 446–47 (2003). Other arguments in favor of public
sector collective bargaining include: (1) that it reduces workplace conflict by
creating regular avenues for dialogue between labor and management; (2) that
it facilitates workplace democracy; and (3) that it facilitates worker
engagement in the political process. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee
Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A Perspective from The United
States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 281 (2013).
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 16-1466).
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means to transfer wealth from taxpayers to public employees.
*******

Supreme Court justices are not immune from the social,
academic, and political trends that have made labor law less
salient. Indeed, as the professional backgrounds of the Justices
become more homogeneous, it might be even more likely that the
Court will not have a labor law expert among its number. But it
does not take an expert to see that something is amiss in Epic
Systems and Janus. Indeed, I would be disappointed if one of my
Labor Law students did not see the deficiency in Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion in Epic Systems.
However, I should acknowledge that perhaps I am seeing
something that is not there. The approach in Epic Systems could
be explained by the Court’s capacious interpretation of the FAA,
which at this point essentially requires enforcement of any form of
covered arbitration agreement.56 And in Janus, the majority may
have been laser-focused on explaining why it was rejecting the
argument that public sector collective bargaining did not involve
genuine issues of public concern. It may have simply gotten carried
away.
Still, at the end of the day, I am struck by the lack of
sophistication and rigor in the Epic Systems and Janus majority
opinions. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise that the Court’s
facility with labor law is, like the field in general, in decline.

56. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in Arbitration
Jurisprudence: How The Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., 129, 131–32 (2012).

